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Gorbachev and Glasnost: Soviet Foreign
Policy for the Future
I. INTRODUCTION TO GORBACHEV'S GLASNOST
In February of 1987 several prominent figures in United States
foreign policy met in Moscow with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev'
to discuss his glasnost policy. 2 Translated literally, glasnost means
openness, 3 but it also has been used to describe Gorbachev's entire
reform program. 4 Additionally, the reorganization within the basic
structure of the Soviet government and the economy has been labeled
perestroika. 5 The emergence of this new thinking raises questions
about the effect glasnost will have in certain areas of great concern to
the western world, namely, existing Soviet trade regulations and the
present levels of Soviet involvement in international trade.
This Comment will address the substance of glasnost and how it
will affect Soviet international policies and the possible United States
responses to the glasnost initiative, particularily in the area of foreign
trade. In order to accomplish this, Soviet and United States foreign
trade regulations will be discussed, specifically the Soviet Enterprise
law, and the Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations and the United
States Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985. The discus-
sion will lead to the conclusion that in order for glasnost to be suc-
cessful in the field of foreign trade, both the Soviet Union and the
United States must seriously consider altering their existing trade
regulations.
II. THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF GLASNOST
Initially an exploration of why Gorbachev began this new policy
1. In March of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary of the Soviet
Union after the death of General Secretary Chernenko. Gorbachev is a graduate of Moscow
University and is a lawyer by profession. Hough, Gorbachev's Strategy, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 33,
34 (1985).
2. Whitaker, Countering Gorbachev, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1987, at 32. Among those
who attended the meeting where Jeane Kirkpatrick, former United States ambassador to the
United Nation and Henry Kissinger, former United States Secretary of State. Id.
3. Glasnost and Us, 244 THE NATION 785, 786 (1987). "Glasnost: Openness, specifi-
cally the government's use of public forums to disclose its activities ... 
4. Id.
5. "Restructuring ... reorganization within the basic structures of government and the
economy." Id.
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of economic and political openness and how he has begun to imple-
ment this plan through the rethinking of Soviet trade and economic
policies is helpful. One major factor is Gorbachev's apparent dissatis-
faction with the state of the Soviet economy.6 Gorbachev has already
taken large steps towards improving the economy of the Soviet
Union. 7 Gorbachev has publicly stated that a vital element of his plan
is reorganization. This implementation has begun within the Soviet
political structure.8 The aim of the reorganization "is to shift the So-
viet Union from 'an overly centralized command system of manage-
ment to a democratic system based mainly on economic methods.' "9
When the Soviet Union's Parliament assembled on June 29,
1987, the major issue to be discussed was the "Law on the Socialist
Enterprise."' 0 This new law took effect in January of 1988 and will
apply to all Soviet factories by 1991. 1 The aim of this law is "to
make companies responsible for their own profits and losses, and to
free them from day-to-day supervision by ministries and central plan-
ners." 2 This new law calls for production factories to achieve finan-
cial independence. Managers of these facilities will be faced with the
responsibility of making their own day to day decisions. In addition
to this change, the earnings of the workers will be a direct reflection of
their performance on the job.
13
Under the new law, production facilities will be able to purchase
6. Whitehead, U.S.-Soviet Relations, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 43, 44 (1987). Whitehead is
the Deputy Secretary of State. See also Goldman, Gorbachev and Economic Reform, 64 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 56 (1985) (Gorbachev is a "man in a hurry who realizes he has to deal with some
significant dilemmas, particularly in the economic sphere").
7. For example, ministries have been reorganized, state committees or super-ministries
created to deal with broad sectors of the economy, and new laws on domestic private enter-
prise have been enacted. Whitehead, supra note 6, at 44.
8. Kirkpatrick, Gorbachev's Campaign is for Real, L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1987, § II, at 5,
col. 3. Kirkpatrick quotes from a copy of a speech that Gorbachev delivered on January 27,
1987 to the Plenum of the Communist Party's Central Committee. In the speech, Gorbachev
stated, "we have begun reorganization and must not look back." Id. In addition, Kirkpatrick
states that one of the themes of Gorbachev's speech was the "criticism of ineffective manage-
ment" in the Soviet Union. Id.
9. Galuska, Reforming The Soviet Economy, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 7, 1987, at 76. (This
issue of Businessweek ran a cover story on the changing Soviet economy and how the Decem-
ber summit with President Ronald Reagan would test Gorbachev's reorganization plans.)
10. The Ayes Have It, THE ECONOMIST, July 4, 1987, at 46.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Supra note 9. One such factory that will be operating under the new Enterprise Law
is the A.A. Zhdanov Vladimir Tractor Works. "For the first time, Zhdanov will have to cover
all its costs and earn enough to finance investments, after turning over half its profits to the
Soviet Tractor Agricultural Machine Ministry." Id. at 79. These factories will not be ex-
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their required supplies directly from the manufacturer as opposed to
taking all their purchase requirements to Gosplan, the single govern-
ment entity that coordinates such efforts. 14 In addition to this, "indus-
trial managers will have increasing control over the use of profits for
reinvestment or as workers' bonuses [a]nd for the first time, they will
risk going bankrupt."' I However, there is much debate as to whether
these proposed changes will amount to any large scale reforms.' 6
Although this new Law on the Socialist Enterprise is well in-
tended,17 two elements of vital importance required to make it suc-
cessful are not included in the plan.' 8  First, there is no "price
mechanism"' 19 that will adequately allow Gorbachev and his eco-
nomic planners to properly determine the future domestic and inter-
national demand for Soviet manufactured goods. 20 Second, the State
will still supply and control all necessary raw materials. 2' The final
word as to whether this enterprise law will have any substantial effect
on either the domestic or international market is still to come.
In addition to these domestic changes, Gorbachev has begun to
direct his attention to the international trade community. He has al-
ready "given [seventy] large factories the right to trade abroad di-
rectly '22 and "he is keenly wooing western companies to set up joint
ventures in [the Soviet Union] .... "23 Previous Soviet regulations
made it difficult for U.S. firms to set up facilities in the Soviet Union.
In May of 1977, the Soviet Union developed a procedure by which a
company could begin activity in their country. 24 Each business had to
obtain a special permit from one of several Soviet ministries or State
committees.25 The U.S. companies can only obtain these permits if
pected to pull their own weight from the outset. The Soviet state will continue to buy about
seventy percent of the factory output for the next three years. Id.
14. Id. at 78.
15. Id.
16. Not the Russian Revolution, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 1987, at 36. "Soviet industry
is in a mess ... The new law is unlikely to sort it out." Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. A price mechanism is an economic indicator that accurately reflects the proper
demand for goods in the market.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Russia's Long Shot, THE ECONOMIST, August 29, 1987, at 11.
23. Id. See also Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1987. (Soviet Union's nine page special advertising
section).
24. W. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 340 (1983).
25. Id.
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they meet one of several requirements:
(1) the foreign firm had to be well-known on the world market
and have concluded large-scale commercial transactions or have a
large goods turnover with the respective Soviet organization or, (2)
carry out industrial co-operation with Soviet enterprises and orga-
nizations or, (3) have concluded very important scientific-technical
co-operation agreements with the respective Soviet organizations
or, (4) seek a permit pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement
with the Soviet Union.
26
If a permit is obtained, it is valid for two years, and then subject to
renewal. When operations begin in the Soviet Union, all necessary
equipment and personnel is supplied by the appropriate local
agency. 27 Despite these restrictions, there has been some indication
that a number of United States companies are discussing the possibil-
ity of setting up joint ventures.
In order to develop these possible ventures, especially with busi-
nesses in the United States, Gorbachev invited top United States busi-
nessmen to meet with him at the Soviet embassy during the 1987
Washington Summit with President Reagan. 2 One United States
company agreed to enter into a joint venture with a Soviet company.
In November of 1987, Combustion Engineering Inc. (CE) set up a
joint venture called Applied Engineered Systems with the Soviet Min-
istry of Oil Refining and Petrochemical. 29 Charles Hugel, president of
CE, stated "[s]trategically, [the Soviet Union] is by far the single larg-
est untapped market." 0 CE's partner in this venture, the Soviet Min-
istry of Oil and Petrochemical, is the largest oil company in the
world. It is larger than Exxon Corp. and the Royal Dutch/Shell
Group combined.31 Applied Engineered Systems, the result of the
joint venture of which CE owns forty-nine percent, "will manufacture
oil and petrochemical controls in the Soviet Union and will help man-
26. Id. at 340-41.
27. Id.
28. See supra note 9, at 77. See also, Flanigan, Gorbachev Has Shopping List for Capital-
ists, L.A. Times, Dec. 6, 1987, § IV, at 1, col. 1. Some of the executives invited to attend this
meeting were: Dwayne Andreas of Archer Daniels Midland, a soybean processor; Richard
Mahoney of Monsanto in chemicals; Wayne Calloway of Pepsico; John Murphy of Dresser
Industries; Fred O'Green of Litton Industries, the chairman of Seagram's; the president of
Coca-Cola; and Armand Hammer of Occidental Petroleum. In addition to these participants,
Charles Hugel, chairman of Combustion Engineering, who recently entered into a joint ven-
ture with a Soviet entity, was in attendance. Id.
29. The Twain Are Meeting-And Cutting Deals, Bus. WK., Dec. 7, 1987, at 88.
30. See supra note 9, at 84.
31. See supra note 29, at 88.
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age the modernization of oil refineries and plants [within the Soviet
Union]." 3
2
The Soviet Government has set up standards by which joint ven-
tures will be measured. These standards govern every aspect of these
ventures from ownership to dispute settlements. 33 A foreign partner
is entitled to own forty-nine percent of the authorized capital of the
joint venture.34 The partner can contribute equipment, technology,
buildings and money. 35 The management of the venture is comprised
of two branches each having representatives from both partners; the
supervising board,36 which makes the strategic decisions, and the ex-
ecutive branch, 37 which performs the day-to-day management of the
venture. Each of these branches has representatives from both part-
ners.38 In the area of foreign trade, the joint venture has the ability to
trade under a general license from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.39
These joint ventures present an interesting question. How are
disputes to be resolved? The Soviet Foreign Trade Advertising
Agency Vneshtorgreklama (SOVERO) states that "[i]t has been de-
cided from the onset that the foreign partners [United States busi-
nesses] should be guaranteed due process of law. Disputes may be
settled either in the court or through arbitration-in the Soviet Union
or in Third World countries. The choice is up to the partners."
' 4
Therefore, if an American company wishes to tap the Soviet market
through a joint venture with a Soviet entity, it will be forced to abide
by this decision when a dispute arises. They will not have the benefit
of the Western courts.
Regardless of these regulations and the uncertainty of any joint
venture, several United States firms have seriously pursued the possi-
bility of following CE and entering into joint ventures. For example,
Pepsico is negotiating to open two Pizza Huts in Moscow, and more if
successful. 41 Occidental Petroleum plans to build a petrochemical
32. Id.
33. New Thinking for Foreign Trade, Bus. WK., Dec. 14, 1987, at 137-42. (Special adver-
tising section prepared by the Soviet Foreign Trade Advertising Agency Vneshtogreklama
(SOVERO)).
34. Id. at 138.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 141.
41. Supra note 29.
1989]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
complex with an Italian company 42 and Honeywell is negotiating to
design plants and provide processing systems for the chemical
industry.
43
Before any United States business determines that it will test the
market of the Soviet Union, it must determine whether the proposed
joint venture is a sound business decision. Management must look at
the costs that will be incurred in order to establish the venture and the
initial production costs. In addition to determining what these costs
will be, they must determine whether the proceeds from the sale of the
product will be sufficient to cover all the production costs. If it is
determined that the venture makes sound business sense, then they
must make sure that they adhere to any and all existing United States
and Soviet trade regulations."
Gorbachev has let it be known to the western world, especially
the United States, that he is looking to make changes that will
strengthen the economic muscles of the Soviet Union. He has ex-
tended the invitation or challenge to the super powers to investigate
the possibilities of involving themselves directly and benefiting from
this transformation. The question now becomes whether the United
States should react favorably to this challenge and if so, will our ex-
isting trade regulations allow us to substantially increase our trade
with the Soviet Union or will these regulations hamper us in such a
way that all possible benefit from any trade would be negated.
III. How SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RESPOND TO
GORBACHEV'S GLASNOST?
In the mid-1970's, during the height of detente with the Soviet
Union, the State Department published a pamphlet that detailed the
number of existing bilateral agreements between the United States
42. Id.
43. Id. In addition to these ventures, several other companies are in negotiations to set
up additional ventures. Monsanto is working on an agreement to set up a herbicide plant.
Archer Daniels Midland is discussing ventures in chicken raising, grain storage and soybean
processing. SSMC is negotiating a venture to produce sewing machines. Dresser Industries is
discussing a venture to produce energy, mining, and construction equipment and Cummins
Engine has begun negotiating a venture that would manufacture diesel engines and compo-
nents. Id.
44. Whitehead, supra note 6, at 45. See also Hewett, Reforming The Economy, 244 THE
NATION 785, 804 (1987). ("Soviet officials are aggressively seeking foreign partners for such
ventures. In addition, seventy Soviet enterprises and twenty ministries will be able to engage
directly in foreign trade .... ")
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and the Soviet Union. 45 Prior to the publication of the pamphlet, a
total of one hundred and five bilateral agreements existed between the
United States and the Soviet Union. 46 Fifty-eight of these agreements
had been signed in the early 1970'S47 and the remaining fifty-seven
had been signed between 1933, when the United States and the Soviet
Union established relations, and the early 1970's.48 The large number
of bilateral agreements entered into during the height of detente sug-
gests that these agreements were considered an essential feature of
detente.
49
However, during the 1970's and 1980's, United States-Soviet re-
lations have worsened. 50 It is believed that the 1979 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan 5' and the "crushing of the Soviet human rights move-
ment following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act 5 2, along with the
Soviets refusal to allow emigration 53, was the turning point in the
United States-Soviet detente. During this period, any hopes of a stra-
tegic arms agreement ended 54 and United States-Soviet relations
worsened.
Another major reason for this downward trend in Soviet-United
States relations are the increased trade restrictions and embargoes im-
posed by the United States government against many countries in-
cluding the Soviet Union.55 Now that Gorbachev has unveiled his
glasnost policy, the United States is faced with the problem of decid-
ing whether these changes are substantial or just Soviet rhetoric. If
the Soviets are found to be in the midst of genuine change, the United
45. Parris, The US-Soviet Bilateral Relationship, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL., 45 (1987).
46. These include agreements on cultural exchanges, science and technonolgy, environ-
mental protection, medical science, public housing, space, agriculture, transportation, and
atomic energy. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Parris, supra note 45. See also, Reforming the Soviet Economy, Bus. WK., Dec. 7,
1987, at 84. Trade between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987 totalled only about
two billion dollars which was mostly grain sales to the Soviet Union.
51. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 forced the United States to discover a new label
for their existing relationship with the Soviet Union because "detente" was no longer a fitting
description. Parris, supra note 45.
52. The United States was not in the position to or able to ignore the Soviets actions in
the area of human relations. Id.
53. Flanigan, supra note 28, at § IV, at 1, col. 1.
54. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trends, Policies and Pros-
pects in Trade Among Countries Having Different Economic and Social Systems at 138, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/918 of August 26, 1982.
55. Id.
1989]
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States must decide whether it should relax its restrictions on the So-
viet Union.
The response and feelings generated by glasnost have varied. Pe-
ter Peterson, Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, 56 ex-
pressed his reservation about the Soviet invitation to United States
firms to establish joint ventures with their Soviet Union counterparts.
"[H]e advises: We should be intrigued, stay cautious, but be open." '5
7
He seriously doubts Gorbachev's ability to reconcile market forces
that dictate what the demand in the market for a particular good will
be against the existing Soviet planned economy which is a set five year
plan dictating what will and will not be produced in Soviet production
facilities.58
Others believe that the glasnost policy, if successful, will ulti-
mately strengthen East-West trade. This idea is reflected by Cyrus
Vance,59 former Secretary of State, who believes that a successful pro-
gram implemented by Gorbachev will eventually lead to a more stable
United States-Soviet relationship and if the Soviet economy is
strengthened, East-West trade will increase. 6°
Many businessmen have begun to see the potential for expansive
and profitable trade agreements with the Soviet Union. They are
describing the Soviet Union as "a huge market. ' 61 However, other
business leaders believe the more realistic approach is to "wait and
see." They maintain that there might be many new opportunities for
trade and economic development, but there should be "no illusion
that a bonanza is in the offering .... ,,62
One affirmative suggestion that has been voiced and acted upon
is that the United States and its allies should begin "reviewing current
export restrictions in the hopes of simplifying the list of prohibited
items and speeding up the licensing process. ' 63 This aspect will be
developed later in this Comment.
All of these reactions lead to the conclusion that the United
States is not yet certain how to respond to Gorbachev's policy. Initi-
56. Trewhitt, Coping with Gorbachev, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., April 13, 1987, at 26.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Cyrus Vance was appointed Secretary of State on January 23, 1977 by President
Jimmy Carter. He remained in this position until his resignation on April 21, 1980. KANE,
FACTS ABOUT THE PRESIDENTS (4th ed. 1981).
60. Whitaker, Countering Gorbachev, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1987, at 33.
61. The Bear Facts, THE EcONOMIST, Feb. 14, 1987, at 56.
62. Id. at 57.
63. Whitehead, supra note 6, at 45.
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ating expansive economic and trade programs with the Soviet Union
would be financially and economically unsound. The United States
must determine Gorbachev's true intentions and how the United
States, as an economic leader, should respond to his challenge.
IV. EXISTING TRADE REGULATONS TO WHICH THE SOVIET
UNION AND UNITED STATES MUST ADHERE?
One major obstacle to any economic venture with the Soviet
Union is the existing trade regulations that hinder both the United
States and the Soviet Union. The two countries have economic and
political systems that are diametrically opposed to one another. Yet if
Gorbachev's policy is to succeed in the international trade arena, the
two systems must establish a plan that will allow them to interact
successfully.
A. Existing Soviet Foreign Trade Regulations
The Soviet Union's international trade is governed by the USSR
Ministry of Foreign Trade. 64 The Ministry of Foreign Trade is a
composite of "more than fifty foreign trade associations 'FTOS' which
carry on about 95% of Soviet foreign trade .... ",65 The Ministry of
Foreign Trade is an extremely complex structure which has an abun-
dance of power and responsibility. 66 The Minister of Foreign Trade is
appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union67 and the Dep-
uty Ministers are appointed by the USSR Council of Ministers. 68 The
actions ultimately taken by the Ministry of Foreign Trade are decided
by the Council of Ministers and other individuals who are appointed
by the Council. 69 These individuals form a group which meets on a
regular basis to draft trade proposals for the Minister of Foreign
Trade who is ultimately responsible for foreign trade. 70 These FTOS
64. W. BUTLER, supra note 24, at 334.
65. Id.
66. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade is an all-union ministry and has responsi-
bility for assisting in the preparation of export and import plans, drafting and negoti-
ating inter-governmental trade agreements, administering foreign trade
representation and the FTOS within its jurisdiction, licensing when necessary the
import, export, or transit of goods, and developing and administering customs policy,
inspecting the quality of export goods, and others.
Id.
67. R. STARR, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE USSR 27 (1975).
68. Id. at 27-28.
69. Id.
70. In addition to this basic structure, the Ministry below the Colligium is divided into
three separate administrations:
1989]
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function not only within the geographical boundaries of the Soviet
Union, but also throughout the world.
Beyond the Soviet borders, the Ministry of Foreign Trade is rep-
resented by specific trade representations or FTOS. 71 "These [trade
representations] are defined by the 1982 Statute on Representations of
the USSR Abroad as agencies of the USSR effectuating abroad the
rights of the USSR in the realm of foreign trade .... "72 Among other
functions, the trade representatives "oversee Soviet trade policy in the
"973receiving country ....
The FTOS are legal entities74 which may acquire property rights
in their own names and may sue and be sued.75 They also have the
right to engage in foreign trade transactions in a particular geographic
area or within a particular product classification.76 In the interna-
tional realm, FTOS conduct normal trade operations and freely enter
into contracts. 77 Within the Soviet borders, the FTOS are able to
enter into binding contracts within other "economically accountable
Soviet State enterprises. ' 78 Despite this legal autonomy, the Soviet
government itself will stand behind the contract that the FTOS enter
into. 79 Despite this limited economic power and duty, the FTOS are
controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 80 The Ministry may liq-
1) The administration for commercial policy (organized according to country
group);
2) The administration for distinct types of activites (includes treaties and legal
administration); and
3) The administration for distinct types of products (includes administration
for exports and imports).
Id. at 28.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 335. "In addition, they protect Soviet interests, study economic and market
trends and developments and inform Soviet institutions about these ... [and] supervise the
activities of FTOs in the receiving country.., and promote participation in Soviet and foreign
trade and industrial exhibitions."
74. Id. at 30.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 31. Some examples of how these FTOS are organized are:
1) Soviet exports of lumber and lumber products are transacted by the All -
Union Export - Import Organization Eksportles;
2) All exports and imports of oil and oil products are controlled by
Soiuznefteksport; and
3) All exports and imports with the Mongolian People's Republic are con-
trolled by Vostokintorg.
Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 32.
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uidate an FTO or dispose of it all together by reorganizing the struc-
ture of the FTOS.1 The FTOS are governed by the 1978 Statute on
the All-Union Economically Accountable Foreign Trade Association
within the System of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.8 2 One of their
functions is to carry out their export and import business in accord-
ance with the five year and the annual Soviet economic plans. 83
The Foreign Trade Ministry remains an exclusive trader in many
of the important economic areas. 84 They have retained control of raw
materials, fuels, foods and some mechanical engineering products. 8 5
The Soviet government has also stated that these reforms should not
be seen as the State abandoning its monopoly on foreign trade. Those
firms given the right to trade in the foreign markets are still governed
by Soviet economic laws and regulated by the appropriate state au-
thority, and their resources will still belong to the State.8 6 "A State
Foreign Economic Commission under the USSR Council of Ministers
will oversee all foreign trade, playing a watch-dog role to guarantee
state interests." 87
Gorbachev must implement his economic policies into future So-
viet five year plans in order for the Ministry of Foreign Trade to prop-
erly carry out its role in the Soviet international trade arena. This
means that any hope of seeing immediate changes and staggering re-
sults is unrealistic. Gorbachev has a structure within which he must
work. There are certain structures, such as the Soviet five year plan,
that must be worked with in order for any actions taken by
Gorbachev to have full effect. Any change in economic trade with
foreign countries will have to be carried out by the FTOS and the
Ministry of Foreign Trade under the existing Soviet structure.
If Gorbachev works closely with the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
there is a strong possibility that his intentions can be correctly imple-
mented. It should be pointed out that his plans will be implemented
because, as the ultimate authority within the Soviet Union, he has the
power to implement any program. But for his plans to be correctly
implemented and reach their full potential, he must work with the
81. Id. at 33.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. New Thinking for Foreign Trade, supra note 33, at 137.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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people and the organization he has assembled around him. If he does
this, the results he desires should be fufilled.
B. Existing United States Trade Regulations
The United States has developed a statutory scheme that regu-
lates what can and cannot be exported to certain countries8 8 including
the Soviet Union. These regulations inhibit United States trade with
the Soviet Union, particularily regarding a large number of commer-
cial goods. The area of major concern to the United States govern-
ment is that of technology, both defense and non-defense related. The
United States has tried to maintain leadership in technology by re-
stricting the free trade of these goods to other highly developed coun-
tries that might use this technology adversely against the United
States. 9 The Export Administration Amendments Act of 196990 "re-
duced controls on the export of civilian goods and technology to com-
munist countries, but continued bans on the export of products and
technology that would assist Soviet military strength." 9'
The United States has created a "dual system of export regula-
tions."' 92 The first branch of the system is controlled by the United
States Munitions List 93 and is regulated by the Arms Export Control
Act. 94 The purpose of the Arms Export Control Act is to implement
the authority of the "President to control the export and import of
defense articles and defense services." 95 "Designation of defense arti-
cles and defense services are based primarily on whether an article or
service is deemed to be inherently military in character. ' 96 If an arti-
cle or service is placed on the United States Munitions List, its export
is regulated exclusively by the Department of State.
97
The second branch of the system is governed by the Export Ad-
ministration Amendments Act of 198598 and the Export Administra-
88. Such statutes are the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1987) and the
Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985).
89. Blair, Export Controls on Nonmilitary Goods and Technology: Are We Penalizing
Ourselves?, 21 TEx. INT'L L. J. 363, 364 (1986).
90. Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 2401, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (terminated 1979).
91. Supra note 89.
92. Id.
93. 22 C.F.R. § 120 (1985).
94. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1987).
95. Supra note 93, § 120.1.
96. Supra note 93, § 120.3.
97. Supra note 93, § 120.4.
98. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 102, 99 Stat.
[Vol. 11:377
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tion Regulations. 99 Under these Acts, the Department of Commerce
maintains the Commodity Control List, which is a listing of the regu-
latory status and procedures for export of particular commodities to
specific countries.I°° All goods and services which are not controlled
or regulated by the Munitions List are controlled by the Export Ad-
ministration Act and the Export Administration Regulation.' 0
The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985 ("EAA")
was the result of over two years of debate in the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate.' 0 2 The EAA reauthorized and revised the Ex-
port Administration Act of 1979.103 The EAA is structured as to
achieve two goals: "first, to reduce the burden of export regulation
and thereby improve the competitive position of the United States
goods and services in the world market, and second, [to reduce the
flow] of restricted, high technology products and data to the Soviet
bloc.",,o4
The purpose of the EAA is to secure the safety of high technol-
ogy within the United States marketplace and beyond by limiting only
those specific items deemed to be a high security risk. All other goods
are free to be traded on the open market.
Therefore, in order to achieve the goals of the EAA, all goods
that are not deemed to be a high risk would be deleted from the re-
stricted list and be free to be traded on the open market. The govern-
ment would have the responsibility of determining whether the goods
presently listed as being restricted are in fact a high security item. If
they are not they should be removed. This would reduce the burden
of export regulations and at the same time restrict those goods which
are in fact high technology items.
In the 1979 Act, Congress established that there is a need to pay
close attention to foreign policy and national security. In actuality,
Congress made specific findings that represented this concern. These
findings were:
1) United States citizens should be able to engage in interna-
120 (1985) (amending Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503
(1979)).
99. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368.1-399.2 (1985).
100. Blair, supra note 89, at 364.
101. Id.
102. Note, The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985." A Reassessment and Pro-
posals for Further Reform, 19 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 812-13 (1986).
103. Id. at 812.
104. Id. at 813.
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tional commerce; 10
2) exports benefit both the United States and the world econ-
omy by increasing employment and production domestically which
strengthens the value of the dollar which in turn reduces inflation;
10 6
3) both the private sector and the Federal Government should
place a high priority on exports so that the national economy is
strengthened;
07
4) foreign policy in the United States is affected by the availa-
bility of some materials that go into the composition of goods that are
exported; 0 8
5) the national security of the United States may be affected by
the unrestricted trade of goods and technology; 0 9
6) uncertainties in export policy can cause domestic business
efforts to be curtailed; 0
7) unreasonable restrictions on access to world supplies can
cause worldwide political and economic instability;"'
8) special attention should be paid to the need to control ex-
ports of technology which have military significance;"
2
9) agricultural commodities should be restricted minimally in
order to achieve a balance of payments and to eliminate world
hunger; "13
10) special emphasis should be given to the control of products
that are hazardous to the public health and environment;" 4
11) there has been an increased threat to the security of the
United States and its allies due to the acquisition of national security
sensitive goods and technology bythe Soviet Union;'"1
12) the United States should seek to eliminate the flow of goods
and technology to controlled countries;" 6 and
13) excessive dependence of the United States and its allies on
105. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1985) (Congressional Findings) (amending 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2401 (1982)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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potential adversaries for energy resources could lead to some
difficulties. ' 17
Because the EAA of 1985 was enacted to "reauthorize and revise"" 8
the EAA of 1979, there may be a question as to whether these policies
are still applicable.
Impliedly, these policies are still the backbone of the EAA of
1985. "[The EAA of 1985] ... has significantly reformulated Ameri-
can export control strategy, with important implications for national
security, foreign relations, and the well-being of American indus-
try."'"19 In addition, the basic objectives 20 of the EAA of 1985 di-
rectly impact the possiblity of conducting meaningful trade with the
Soviet Union and other countries. These implications and objectives
are compatible with the concerns stated by Congress in its 1979 find-
ing. If the objectives are to be taken seriously and strived for, in-
creased trade with the Soviet Union in areas other than defense and
high technology will be a distinct possibility.
If the United States desires to increase trade with the Soviet
Union, the EAA will have to be utilized so that trade will involve only
those goods that the United States government deems appropriate.
Such goods will have to be items not included on the Military Critical
Technologies List and thus subject to trade control by the Secretaries
of Defense and Commerce.' 2'
It is still possible for the United States to abide by its initial pol-
icy decision established when the EAA came into existence and to
increase trade with the Soviet Union. The basic policy of the EAA is
to apply national security controls "to the maximum extent possible
117. Id.
118. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, supra note 98.
119. Feldman, The Restructuring of National Security Controls Under the 1985 Amend-
ments to the Export Administration Act. Multilateral Diplomacy and the Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of United States Law, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 235 (1985).
120. The [EAA of 1985] has three basic objectives:
1) To improve the effectiveness of existing controls on high technology trade
with the Soviet Union by improving licensing decisions, enforcement, and interna-
tional cooperation;
2) To develop new controls on transfer of [defense technology] with maximum
international cooperation; and
3) To reduce the burden of controls on United States trade and foreign rela-
tions by decentralizing exports of less sensitive goods to cooperating nations, ex-
pediating routine licensing decisions, and eventually eliminating contols on items
available to our adversaries from other sources.
Id. at 236-37.
121. Id.
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in cooperation with all nations" 122 to restrict the export of goods and
technology that "make a significant contribution to the military po-
tential" of the-nation's adversaries. 123 The United States may choose
to increase trade in areas that are not deemed to be contributing to the
military potential of the Soviet Union. This may bypass the restric-
tions placed on military goods.
There is a strong indication that United States business interests
have determined that nonmilitary goods can be traded with relative
ease. As stated earlier, several companies have already established or
are in negotiations with the Soviet Union to establish joint ventures.
Examples of the nonmilitary ventures include grain storage machin-
ery, energy, mining, construction equipment, and the production of
diesel components. 
124
In addition to the EAA restrictions placed on corporations
within the United States, the United States cooperates with fourteen
of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") allies in volun-
tarily restricting exports so that the security of all NATO members is
preserved. 12 5 The organization that has been formed for this purpose
is known as COCOM. 126 COCOM implements plans that control the
shipment of strategic products to communist countries. 127 As with the
restrictions implemented by the United States government, if
COCOM relaxes its requirements or restrictions on which goods can
be traded, the result will be an increase in trade between the United
States and other countries, particularly the Soviet Union.
128
Thus, if Gorbachev's glasnost policy opens up the Soviet Union
to expanded international trade and the United States chooses to take
122. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(3)(A) (1982); see also note 1 at 238.
123. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (1982).
124. Supra note 43.
125. R. STARR, supra note 67, at 17.
126. Id. COCOM stands for International Coordinating Committee on Strategic Trade
with Communist Countries.
127. The COCOM members are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Greece, Holland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States. Levine, Technology Transfer: Exports Controls Ver-
sus Free Trade, 21 TEX. INT'L L. J. 373, 377 n.12 (1986) (citing Overman, Reauthorization of
the Export Administration Act: Balancing Trade Policy with National Security, 17 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 325, 362 (1985); Sherzer & Yeser, Exports Controls Over Direct Commercial Sales
of Military and Strategic Goods and Technologies: Who's In Charge?, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 303, 312 (1984)).
128. This was also the recommendation of the Defense Science Board contained in a re-
port published in 1986. It recommended that the United States export control rules be
refocused so that the number of controlled items would be reduced. Levine, supra note 127, at
377.
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advantage of this policy, the United States businessperson must com-
ply with the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration
Act, and the Export Administration Regulations. Gorbachev's glas-
nost policy will not affect these regulations unless the United States
government, possibly through pressure applied by the American busi-
ness community, decides that these regulations need to be relaxed.
V. POSSIBLE CHANGES TO BE IMPLEMENTED BEFORE
GORBACHEV'S TRADE POLICY CAN BE SUCCESSFUL
In order for Gorbachev to successfully implement his policy,
concessions must be made by both the United States and the Soviet
Union. This is vital only if the United States has any desire to con-
duct increased business in the Soviet marketplace.
Many view the major obstacle to developing any large scale trade
between the United States and Soviet Union as being the political and
economic tension between the two super powers. "The implementa-
tion of the glasnost policy depends greatly upon a significant reduc-
tion in the tensions between the United States and the Soviet
Union."' 129 Gorbachev himself said "[w]e need a lasting peace to con-
centrate on the development of our society and to tackle the task of
improving the life of the Soviet People." 130 "The principle of peaceful
coexistence and the need to consolidate international detente has al-
ways been . . .the cornerstone of the Soviet Union's relations with
countries having different economic and social systems." 131
In addition to the strengthening of ties with the United States,
the Soviet Union must loosen government regulation of the economy
so that economic planning will be more efficient and economic waste
will decrease. 132 Gorbachev has outlined this economic reform in
both speeches and public statements. 133 He has stated that this trans-
129. Glasnost and Us, 244 THE NATION 785, 786 (1987).
130. Id.
131. United Nations Conference, supra note 54, at 136. In 1982 the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development stated: "The firm intention to maintain stable and mutu-
ally advantageous trade and economic, scientific and technical ties with those Western
countries which are prepared to co-operate with the Soviet Union was recently confirmed by
the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." Id.
132. Hewett, Reforming The Economy, 244 THE NATION 802 (1987). See also Hough,
Gorbachev's Strategy, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 33 (1985). "[T]he Soviet system is too centralized,
and the problem becomes progressively worse as the economy becomes more complex ....
With all investments and product decisions having to go through the ministries and the State
Planning Committee ... in Moscow, huge bottlenecks and inflexibilities result." Id. at 41.
133. Hewett, supra note 132, at 802.
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formation requires a "two-stage strategy." 134 The first stage will
stress discipline, better personnel, and investment policies to get the
economy on a new path. 135 This goal will be attained by increasing
the responsibility of the worker and informing the worker, through
educational programs, of his or her responsibility in the economic
scheme. The second stage has been labeled "sustained growth."'
136
This stage will concentrate on sustaining the growth obtained in the
first stage. Included in this transformation are plans to encourage
"individual and enterprise initiative by loosening the government's
control of the economy."' 137 The ultimate goal of the policy is to up-
grade economic planning. 138
These proposed departures from domestic economic control have
spilled over into the Soviet international trade. The allowance of for-
eign investment and joint venture projects are a radical departure
from past procedures in which no foreign investment or joint ventures
with western business were practiced. 39 Soviet government must do
more if it hopes to fully integrate into the world economy. However,
it must be noted that this system, although allowing limited foreign
investment and joint ventures, is ultimately controlled by a central
government and is not western capitalism; "[tihe government will still
own almost all the means of production, and central planners will
continue to have enormous influence." 14
Whether Gorbachev's glasnost policy will be implemented fully
and function to the point of increasing foreign trade with the West
remains to be seem. Gorbachev has outlined what he believes to be
the road to successfully implementing glasnost. His ideas are radical
in the eyes of Soviet officials and those that follow the development of
the Soviet Union. It is hard to believe that one man could change
years of thinking in such a short time in order to restructure an eco-
nomic machine. It is equally hard to believe that the Soviet Union
would be willing to loosen government regulations or make tremen-
dous concessions in their foreign policy. However, if glasnost is to be
effective and reach Gorbachev's goals, then changes will have to occur
in these areas. Unless changes are made, the United States and other
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 804.
140. Id. at 803.
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powerful western nations will be unable to work with many of the
existing Soviet regulations. The two systems are worlds apart. The
Soviet Union will have to determine how intent it is to enter the world
of foreign trade with the West. The Soviet Enterprise Law is clearly a
first step designed to reach this goal.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the United States decides to increase its trade with the Soviet
Union, concessions must be made in its foreign trade policy. As
stated earlier, the United States should consider reducing the number
of items that are prohibited from being traded internationally.141 By
doing this, goods that are not defense oriented or damaging to the
national security of the United States will be freely sold to the Soviet
Union. The government has already begun to ease some economic
restraints that have in the past hampered United States-Soviet
trade. 142 In January of 1987, the United States government decided
to minimize the foreign policy controls on the export of oil and gas
equipment into the Soviet Union. 143 As a result of this action, "[t]he
United States oil and gas industry now have an opportunity to com-
pete for Soviet markets on a more level playing field."' 44
Finally, the United States should encourage implementation of
joint ventures with Soviet manufacturers 45 provided that these ven-
tures make sound business sense and comply with all export regula-
tions. This is an important step in expanding international trade with
the Soviet Union. 46 The Soviet Union has sought admission into the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and has enacted
laws intended to encourage foreign investments.147 These actions al-
low one to believe that Gorbachev is serious about glasnost and the
future of the Soviet Union in the area of international trade.
It is undisputed that the United States desires to be the leader in
technology. It is also undisputed that the goods and services that
would be most appealing to many countries, including the Soviet
Union, would be those of high technology. Under no circumstances
would the United States government be willing to jepordize their sta-
141. Whitehead, supra note 6, at 45.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Evangelista, "New Thinking" in Foreign Policy, 244 THE NATION 795, 798 (1987).
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tus as the leader in technology. Therefore, there is little hope of
changing the regulations that govern the trade of these goods. How-
ever, as stated earlier, this does not mean that the United States gov-
ernment should develop a regulatory list that is overinclusive. The
government should seriously look at the goods that are regulated and
determine if there is a need to restrict the movement of these goods.
In the area of joint ventures, the government can encourage such
projects, but ultimately, the interested business must make a sound
business decision as to whether the venture will be sufficiently profita-
ble. No business, even upon the blessing of the United States govern-
ment, will set up a venture in the Soviet Union if there will be
insufficient demand for their product in the Soviet Union and abroad.
This ultimately may be the major stumbling block. Where will the
demand for these goods come? If the answer is the Soviet Union, will
there be the required buying power to purchase the goods? There
must be money to purchase these goods. If the venture is too costly,
thus pricing the goods out of the range of the consumer, the venture
will never become a reality. Therefore, even if the United States gov-
ernment encourages these joint ventures and perhaps offers incentives
to the participating companies, these ventures will not be a success
without the occurence of certain economic factors which are beyond
the control of the United States government. One must keep in mind
a recent invitation extended by Gorbachev in which he said, ". . . all
wanting to work with us in new, more favorable conditions will gain
from the successful realization of the plans of restructuring in our
country and the modernization of the economy.
' 148
However, these obstacles can be overcome if both the Soviet
Union and the United States work to make Gorbachev's glasnost pol-
icy a success. If this occurs, there is a strong possibility that foreign
trade between the two countries will increase. John C. Whitehead,
the Deputy Secretary of State, 149 stated in his address at a Forum on
U.S.-Soviet Trade Relations: "if the Soviets are interested in improv-
ing relations, we are ready to work with them to build a more stable
relationship, sustainable over the long term. This is a time of chal-
lenge but also a great opportunity. We look forward to tackling these
challenges, and building on those opportunities."' 50
Additionally, a series of recent articles determined that the cru-
148. Supra note 33, at 139.
149. Whitehead, supra note 6, at 43.
150. Id. at 45.
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cial difference between the reforms set out by former Soviet Premier
Brezhnev and Gorbachev's glasnost is that Brezhnev attempted to im-
plement United States-Soviet relations while "maintaining the status
quo in the Soviet Union."II On the other hand, "Gorbachev seeks to
implement United States-Soviet relations while pushing radical
changes at home." 52 The conclusion reached in this series of articles
was that United States-Soviet relations will be long lasting if
"Gorbachev manages to open up Soviet society and force more eco-
nomic links with the rest of the world."
1 53
Recently Gorbachev characterized how his glasnost policy af-
fects the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In February of 1987,
Gorbachev called attention to the revolutionary transformation tak-
ing place in his country, to the need for a wide democratization of the
entire life of the society. He declared that a fair assessment of Soviet
foreign policy required an understanding of the goals of domestic re-
form. He maintains that the Soviet international policy depends on
United States internal policy.'
54
Therefore, any hope of increasing foreign trade depends greatly
on the success of the glasnost campaign and whether Gorbachev's do-
mestic reforms are successful and cause a change in the international
arena. One can conclude that Gorbachev is seriously looking at the
existing structure in the Soviet Union and trying to determine how he
can balance the political beliefs of a nation and the desire to enter a
new economic age. Regardless of what will occur in the future, the
first step has been taken. All that remains to be seen, is what type of
effect the new Soviet Enterprise Law will have on Gorbachev's glas-
nost policy and the area of international trade.
Cynthia Suzanne Gunther
151. Supra note 9, at 88.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Glasnost and Us, supra note 3, at 795.
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